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Abstract
We examine the impact of multiproduct nonlinear pricing on profit, consumer sur-
plus and welfare in a duopoly. When consumers buy all their products from one firm
(the one-stop shopping model), nonlinear pricing leads to higher profit and welfare,
but often lower consumer surplus, than linear pricing. By contrast, in a unit-demand
model where consumers may buy one product from one firm and another product from
another firm, bundling generally acts to reduce profit and welfare and to boost con-
sumer surplus. In a more general model where consumers may buy from more than
one firm and where consumers have elastic demands for each product, nonlinear pricing
has ambiguous eﬀects. Compared with linear pricing, nonlinear pricing tends to raise
profit but harm consumer surplus when: (i) demand is elastic, (ii) there is substantial
product diﬀerentiation, (iii) there is substantial heterogeneity in consumer demand,
(iv) consumers face substantial shopping costs when visiting more than one firm, and
(v) a consumer’s brand preference for one product is strongly correlated with her brand
preference for another product. Nonlinear pricing is more likely to lead to welfare gains
when (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) hold, but (iii) does not.
1 Introduction
Most economic analysis of imperfect competition is based on the assumption of linear pricing,
where the price of a combination of purchases from a firm, whether of one or more products,
is equal to the sum of the prices of the component parts. While many markets operate
on that basis, an increasing number feature nonlinear pricing–for example, discounts for
purchases of larger volumes or of more products. In the absence of easy arbitrage, which
∗The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) is gratefully acknowledged. We are
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would undermine it, such pricing can be observed in more or less competitive markets as
well as in some with market power.
Examples include energy markets, which traditionally were monopolies but are now open
to varying degrees of competition. Consumers are often able to buy their gas and electricity
from a single supplier or from two suppliers. In each case, consumers typically face nonlinear
tariﬀs, and they will often enjoy an additional discount if they purchase both services from a
single supplier. Similarly, consumers nowadays can often source telecommunications, cable
television and internet services from a single supplier or from several, and nonlinear pricing
and bundling are commonplace. Nonlinear pricing is also to be seen in areas such as air travel
(both individual and corporate) and supermarkets, where loyalty schemes have become more
prevalent with the advent of electronic point-of-sale information. The economic importance
of nonlinear pricing goes wider still. Thus labour contracts may include extra pay for longer
tenure, so that a two-period worker gets a better deal than two one-period workers.1 While
the provision of incentives is doubtless a prime reason for such nonlinear wages, the nature
of multi-period competition by firms for labour may also be of relevance, and there may be
parallels with multi-product competition among firms for consumers.
The aim of this paper is to compare linear and nonlinear pricing in various settings with
imperfect (duopoly) competition. We explain why equilibrium nonlinear pricing is better for
profit and welfare and worse for consumers than equilibrium linear pricing in some settings,
and why the opposite is true in other settings.
There is an extensive literature on nonlinear pricing and bundling.2 In the context
of monopoly supply, analyses include Adams and Yellen (1976), McAfee, McMillan, and
Whinston (1989), Armstrong (1996), and Rochet and Choné (1998). In particular, the latter
two papers demonstrate the complexity of multiproduct nonlinear pricing for a monopolist,
and the profit-maximizing tariﬀ can be derived only in a few isolated examples. Whinston
(1990) and Nalebuﬀ (2004) have explored aspects of the relationship between (pure) bundling
and entry deterrence by an incumbent monopolist. There is also a growing literature on
(more or less) competitive nonlinear pricing and bundling by symmetrically-placed firms.
For example Spulber (1979), Stole (1995), Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and
Stole (2002) examine competitive nonlinear pricing in situations in which consumers purchase
all products from a single supplier. The latter two papers suggest that marginal-cost pricing
often emerges as a nonlinear pricing equilibrium, in which case welfare is boosted when firms
oﬀer such tariﬀs compared with linear pricing.3 More generally, a theme in Armstrong and
Vickers (2001) is that when consumers are one-stop shoppers, firms choose socially desirable
tariﬀs if given freedom to do so.
But how reasonable is the assumption that consumers buy all relevant products from
1See, for example, Stevens (2004).
2Armstrong (2006) and Stole (2006) are recent surveys.
3There is no systematic comparison between nonlinear and linear pricing in terms of profit and consumer
surplus in those papers, although Armstrong and Vickers (2001) show when consumers have homogeneous
demands that profit rises and consumer surplus falls when two-part tariﬀs are employed.
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a single supplier? The competitive bundling literature, including the contributions by
Matutes and Regibeau (1992), Anderson and Leruth (1993), Reisinger (2006) and Thanas-
soulis (2006), investigates nonlinear pricing when some consumers wish to buy products from
more than one supplier. This line of analysis suggests that bundling tends to harm profit
and welfare but to be pro-consumer. It tends to proceed by way of worked examples and
assumes that consumers wish to buy only one unit of a product. Moreover, the models make
the polar opposite assumption from the one-stop shopping models that consumers face no
intrinsic extra “shopping cost” if they buy from more than one firm. Thus, the literature on
competitive nonlinear pricing and bundling has yielded starkly conflicting results about the
pros and cons of nonlinear pricing, which our analysis seeks to reconcile.
The rest of the paper, and the main results, can be summarized as follows. Our point of
departure in section 2 is a Hotelling model of product diﬀerentiation with one-stop shopping
and consumers with heterogeneous demands.4 We show that with nonlinear pricing and
all consumers served, the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model has, in eﬀect, two-
part tariﬀs with marginal prices equal to marginal costs. Welfare is maximized with such
nonlinear pricing, whereas with linear pricing there is the problem of excessive marginal
prices. Profit is also higher than with linear pricing for two reinforcing reasons that relate to
elasticity of demand and the extent of consumer heterogeneity. Consumer surplus is however
typically lower than with linear pricing.
A limitation of this model is the assumption that each consumer patronizes just one
firm. Section 3 examines the possibility of two-stop shopping–where consumers choose on
the basis of prices and brand preferences whether to buy from both firms or just one–in
a two-dimensional model of product diﬀerentiation with inelastic demand.5 Discounts for
joint purchase–mixed bundling–are a general feature of the nonlinear pricing equilibrium,
and have a simple characterization. These discounts, however, give rise to the problem of
excessive loyalty, in that there is too much one-stop shopping. Therefore, in contrast to
the one-stop shopping model, welfare is lower when nonlinear pricing is used. Remarkably,
the profit and consumer surplus comparisons between linear and nonlinear pricing are also
exactly the opposite of those from the one-stop shopping model.
A unifying model, which allows for consumers to have elastic and heterogeneous demands,
is analyzed in section 4. With nonlinear pricing permitted and all consumers buying some
of both products, there is an equilibrium with eﬃcient two-part tariﬀs–i.e., with marginal
prices equal to marginal costs. Moreover, the fixed elements of the tariﬀs are precisely the
same equilibrium prices, with the same discount for one-stop shopping, as in the model of
section 3 with inelastic demand. Therefore, the nonlinear pricing equilibrium, unlike that
with linear pricing, is free from the excessive marginal price problem, but it does suﬀer from
the excessive loyalty problem. The models in sections 2 and 3 each had just one of these
eﬀects; hence their contrasting results. Perhaps surprisingly, the analysis of competitive
4This develops the models of Armstrong and Vickers (2001, section 4) and Rochet and Stole (2002).
5This develops the model of Matutes and Regibeau (1992).
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linear pricing sometimes turns out to be simpler than either (a) monopoly nonlinear pricing
or (b) competitive linear pricing.
Section 5 pursues the comparison between linear and nonlinear pricing in terms of five
underlying economic influences: (i) demand elasticity, (ii) product diﬀerentiation, (iii) con-
sumer heterogeneity, (iv) costs of going to more than one supplier, and (v) correlation in
brand preferences. Table 1 indicates whether an increase in each of these influences tends to
add to or subtract from the merits of nonlinear pricing relative to linear pricing for welfare,
profit and consumer surplus.
Welfare Profit Consumers
(i) demand elasticity + + —
(ii) product diﬀerentiation + + —
(iii) consumer heterogeneity — + —
(iv) shopping costs + + —
(v) brand preference correlation + + —
Table 1: Eﬀects on the relative merits of nonlinear pricing
The excessive marginal prices eﬀect becomes more important relative to the excessive
loyalty eﬀect–which favours nonlinear pricing in welfare terms–as demand elasticity, prod-
uct diﬀerentiation, consumer homogeneity, shopping costs and brand preference correlation
increase. For example, the excessive marginal prices eﬀect and the excessive loyalty eﬀect
respectively increase in importance with more elastic demand (because deadweight welfare
loss ‘triangles’ open up) and as shopping costs fall (because more consumers two-stop shop).
The direction of eﬀects on profit tends to be the opposite of that on consumer surplus. In
respect of (i), (ii), (iv) and (v), the profit eﬀect has the same sign as the welfare eﬀect. But
with greater consumer heterogeneity, the relative merits of nonlinear pricing for welfare and
consumers tend to be lower. That is because heterogeneity sharpens linear price competition,
which is good for consumers and welfare (as the excessive marginal price eﬀect diminishes)
but is bad for profit.
Section 6 concludes by suggesting directions for future research on this topic.
2 Nonlinear Pricing and One-Stop Shopping
Suppose there are n ≥ 1 products, each supplied by two firms, denoted A and B. For
exogenous reasons, suppose consumers buy all their suppliers from one firm or the other,
i.e., consumers are one-stop shoppers. Consumers diﬀer in their brand preference for the two
firms, x, and their preference for the products, θ. The parameter x is uniformly distributed
between 0 (where firm A is located) and 1 (where B is located), while θ is independently
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distributed according to some distribution function F (θ).6 Gross utility (excluding transport
costs) is u(θ, q) if a type-θ consumer buys quantities q. Lump-sum transport cost is t per
unit of distance. In sum, a type-(x, θ) consumer’s net utility if she buys quantities qA from
firm A in return for payment TA is
u(θ, qA)− tx− TA ,
and if she buys quantities qB from B with payment TB her utility is
u(θ, qB)− t(1− x)− TB .
In the following analysis, we make the important assumption, which is satisfied subject
to conditions on willingness-to-pay relative to costs, that all consumers choose to participate
in the market with the relevant range of tariﬀs. Finally, suppose each firm has constant unit
cost ci for supplying product i.
Our first result derives the equilibrium nonlinear tariﬀ, which we will use to compare
with linear pricing.7 ,8
Proposition 1 Suppose that over the relevant range of nonlinear tariﬀs all consumers are
served. Then the unique symmetric equilibrium outcome with nonlinear pricing involves
eﬃcient consumption, and a consumer who buys quantities q makes payment
T (q) = t+
P
i
ciqi . (1)
Equilibrium industry profit is πNL = t.
Proof. That the cost-based two-part tariﬀ in (1) is an equilibrium was established in Arm-
strong and Vickers (2001, Proposition 5). That this tariﬀ induces the unique symmetric
equilibrium outcome can be argued by contradiction. Suppose that in an alternative sym-
metric equilibrium, industry profit is Π. Suppose further that the equilibrium tariﬀ T (·)
does not satisfy ∂∂qiT (·) ≡ ci. Suppose firm A deviates from the candidate equilibrium, and
instead sets the tariﬀ Tˆ (q) = Π+
P
i ciqi. A consumer located at x will buy from firm A if
v∗(θ)−Π− tx ≥ v(θ)− t(1− x), where
v∗(θ) = max
q
: u(θ, q)−
P
i
ciqi
6The assumption that x is uniform is made purely for expositional convenience, and none of the following
results depend on this assumption. If x were instead distributed on [0, 1] with density f(x) which is symmetric
about x = 12 , then subject to regularity conditions on f(·) the following results remain valid if ‘t’ is replaced
by ‘t/f(12)’.
7Note that this result need not hold if (i) θ and x are correlated, (ii) firms have diﬀerent costs, or (iii) if
some consumers do not buy from either firm. See Rochet and Stole (2002) for further details.
8We do not claim that the tariﬀ in (1) is the unique symmetric tariﬀ. For instance, if all consumers
purchased quantities above some positive lower bound, how the tariﬀ is defined for quantities below this
lower bound cannot be uniquely determined.
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and
v(θ) = max
q
: u(θ, q)− T (q) .
Let
x(θ) =
1
2
+
v∗(θ)−Π− v(θ)
2t
be the marginal x consumer in the θ-segment. Then A’s deviation profit is Eθ[x(θ)]×Π, and
so the deviation is profitable if Eθ[x(θ)] > 12 , i.e., if
Eθ[v∗(θ)] > Π+Eθ[v(θ)] .
(Here and elsewhere, Eθ[·] refers to taking expectations with respect to θ using F (θ).) How-
ever, the left-hand side of the above is total surplus with marginal cost pricing, and the
right-hand side is total surplus with candidate tariﬀ (which does not always involve mar-
ginal cost pricing). Therefore, this inequality is indeed satisfied, and the unique symmetric
equilibrium outcome involves marginal-cost pricing.
Consider next the outcome when linear prices are used. Suppose that the type-θ consumer
has demand functions qi(θ, p), where p is the vector of linear prices p = (p1, ..., pn). (These
demands are the quantities q which maximize u(θ, q)−
Pn
i=1 piqi.) Let
v(θ, p) = max
q
: u(θ, q)− pq
be type-θ consumer surplus with prices p. Let π(θ, p) be type-θ profit, i.e., π(θ, p) ≡Pn
i=1 qi(θ, p)(pi − ci). It is convenient to introduce one further piece of notation: for a
candidate symmetric equilibrium price vector p, define
s(θ, r) ≡ v(θ, c+ r(p− c)) ,
where r is a scalar. This allows us to conduct the analysis in terms of the scalar r rather
than the vector p. Then s(θ, 0) = v(θ, c) and s(θ, 1) = v(θ, p). Since v is convex in p, s is
convex in r and so srr(θ, r) ≥ 0. Note that
π(θ, c+ r(p− c)) = −rsr(θ, r) .
In particular π(θ, p) = −sr(θ, 1). For p to be a symmetric equilibrium price vector, it is
necessary that r = 1 maximizes a firm’s profit
Eθ
·µ
1
2
+
s(θ, r)− s(θ, 1)
2t
¶
(−rsr(θ, r))
¸
.
This has the first-order condition9
πL = Eθ[−sr(θ, 1)] = Eθ
·
srr(θ, 1) +
(sr(θ, 1))2
t
¸
, (2)
9The second-order condition on r is satisfied provided Eθ[srrr(θ, 1)] is not strongly negative, which we
assume henceforth.
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where πL is the equilibrium industry profit with linear prices.
Expression (2) implies that
πL = Eθ
·
srr(θ, 1) +
(sr(θ, 1))2
t
¸
≥ 1
t
Eθ
£
(sr(θ, 1))2
¤
≥ 1
t
(Eθ[sr(θ, 1])2 =
1
t
π2L . (3)
The first inequality follows since srr ≥ 0, and the inequality is strict if consumer demand
is elastic. We can refer to this as the “elasticity” eﬀect. The second inequality follows
from Jensen’s inequality. It is strict if there is some consumer heterogeneity (i.e., if the
variance of sr(θ, 1) is positive); this is the “heterogeneity” eﬀect. Expression (3) shows that
πL ≤ t = πNL. Hence profits are lower when linear pricing is employed than with nonlinear
pricing.10 The reason for this is a combination of the elasticity and heterogeneity eﬀects,
both of which act in the same direction. (These two eﬀects are discussed in more detail in
sections 5.1 and 5.3.)
Clearly, the marginal-cost pricing that is implemented by nonlinear pricing is unambigu-
ously beneficial for welfare (as well as for profits, as we have seen). A more subtle issue is
the impact of nonlinear pricing on consumer surplus. For a type-θ consumer, the welfare
loss of using linear prices relative to nonlinear prices, which we know involves prices equal
to marginal costs, is
v(θ, c)− [v(θ, p) + π(θ, p)] = s(θ, 0)− s(θ, 1) + sr(θ, 1) .
If consumers have linear demands (or generally when t is small) this welfare loss is 1
2
srr(θ, 1).
(The reason for this is that with linear demands s(θ, r) is quadratic in r, and so a second-
order Taylor expansion about r = 1 is exactly accurate.) In this case, the aggregate welfare
gain when firms employ nonlinear pricing is ∆W = 1
2
Eθ[srr(θ, 1)]. From (3) we see
2∆W = πL −
1
t
Eθ
£
(sr(θ, 1))2
¤
≤ πL −
1
t
(Eθ [sr(θ, 1)])2 = πL −
1
t
π2L ,
i.e.,
∆W ≤ 1
2
πL
t
(t− πL) ≤
1
2
(t− πL) ,
where the second inequality follows from our previous result that πL ≤ t. Therefore, with
linear demands the welfare gain is less than half the gain in industry profit, and so consumers
in aggregate are worse oﬀ when nonlinear tariﬀs are used.11
We can summarise our analysis of the one-stop shopping model as:
10Note that this profit comparison seems to be valid in an alternative framework in which consumers
incur transport costs on a per-unit rather than a lump-sum basis (at least when transport costs are small),
although the analysis is considerably more complicated. For instance, see Proposition 5 in Yin (2004) for
analysis with linear demand.
11The result that consumers are worse oﬀ with nonlinear pricing can be established under weaker assump-
tions than linear demand. For example, let ζ(θ) be the elasticity for a type-θ consumer of welfare loss relative
to the first best with respect to r, evaluated at r = 1. If ζ(θ) > 1 for all θ, then the result holds. (With
linear demands ζ = 2.)
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Proposition 2 Suppose that over the relevant range of tariﬀs all consumers are served.
Then compared to the outcome with linear pricing, industry profit and total welfare are higher
with nonlinear pricing. In addition, if each consumer’s demand is linear in prices (or if t is
small), consumer surplus is lower with nonlinear pricing.
In the unique symmetric equilibrium with nonlinear pricing, firms use cost-reflective (so
eﬃcient) two-part tariﬀs. The optimal fixed fee (t) in such a tariﬀ balances (i) the firm’s
loss of profit on existing consumers against (ii) its gain in profitable consumers from the
other firm. Demand per consumer does not change: it is as if consumers had identical
inelastic demands. By contrast, if firms are restricted to linear prices, a firm choosing its
price(s) will balance (i) against not only (ii) but also (iii) its gain in profit per consumer.
Profit per consumer can change for two reasons. First, with elastic demands, lower prices
expand demand from each type of consumer. Second, and less obviously, if consumers are
heterogeneous, lowering prices can alter the mix of consumer types coming to a firm–in
particular by winning proportionately more high demand (hence high profit) consumers
than low demand consumers from the other firm. This second reason why average profit-
per-consumer may rise as linear prices are reduced occurs even if consumers have inelastic
demands. These two reasons are reflected in the two inequalities in equation (3). They are
both reasons why there is more incentive to lower prices–hence why consumers do better–
with linear pricing. Yet welfare is higher with nonlinear pricing because there is no marginal
price ineﬃciency. It follows that profits must be higher then too.
3 Bundling and Two-Stop Shopping
In this section we analyze a model of multi-product competition where consumers can “mix-
and-match” products from two firms. We assume here that consumers have unit demands.
This case is of interest in its own right; it will also provide the key to the more general elastic
demand analysis in sections 4 and 5.
3.1 The Framework
Consider a two-dimensional Hotelling model. Two firms, A and B, each oﬀer their own
brand of two products, 1 and 2. The location (or brand preference) of a consumer is denoted
(x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]2. Let x1 represent a consumer’s distance from firm A’s brand of product 1
and x2 represent a consumer’s distance from the same firm’s brand of product 2. The density
of (x1, x2) is f(x1, x2) and firms are symmetrically placed in terms of consumers:
f(x1, x2) ≡ f(1− x1, 1− x2) . (4)
The transport cost (or brand preference) parameter is t1 for product 1 and t2 for product
2. In addition to these transport costs, consumers face an additional “shopping cost” z ≥ 0
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when they source supplies from two firms. This shopping cost might represent the time
or cost involved in visiting two shops rather than one, or it might measure a consumer’s
perceived cost of dealing with two firms (paying two bills rather than one, for instance).
In order to have some two-stop shoppers in equilibrium, it is necessary to constrain the
shopping cost not to be too large, and we assume that
z < min{t1, t2} .
If this inequality does not hold, all consumers will choose to buy both items from one firm
or the other, and the distinction between bundling and linear pricing vanishes.
0 1
x1
x2
1
1
2
+
PB2 −PA2 +δA+z
2t2
1
2
− P
A
1 −PB1 +δB+z
2t1
1
2
− P
A
2 −PB2 +δB+z
2t2
1
2
+
PB1 −PA1 +δA+z
2t1
Both products from A
1 from A
2 from B
1 from B
2 from A
Both products from B
.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................
.................................................................................
Figure 1: The Pattern of Consumer Demand
Since consumers have unit demand for each product, a firm’s tariﬀ consists of three prices.
Let P i1 denote firm i’s stand-alone price for its product 1, let P
i
2 be its stand-alone price for
its product 2, and let δi be its discount if a consumer buys both products, so the total charge
for buying both products from firm i is P i1+P
i
2− δi. For simplicity, suppose that conditions
in the market are such that all consumers buy both products. The type-(x1, x2) consumer’s
total outlay if she buys both products from firm A is PA1 + P
A
2 − δA + t1x1 + t2x2, her total
outlay if she buys both products fromB is PB1 +P
B
2 −δB+t1(1−x1)+t2(1−x2), and her total
outlay if she buys product i fromA and product j 6= i fromB is PAi +PBj +tixi+tj(1−xj)+z.
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The consumer located at (x1, x2) will choose the option from among the four possibilities
which involves the smallest outlay. The pattern of demand is as shown in Figure 1.
For simplicity of notation, suppose that production is costless. (This is without loss of
generality if marginal costs are constant, and the prices Pi derived below can be considered to
be prices net of marginal costs.) In this case, when firms oﬀer the same tariﬀ with stand-alone
prices P1 and P2 and discount (if applicable) δ, industry profit is
(P1 + P2)− δ × {proportion of one-stop shoppers} . (5)
In the following analysis, it is useful to introduce some further notation.
0 1
x1
x2
1
1
2
+ δ+z
2t2
1
2
− δ+z
2t1
1
2
− δ+z
2t2
1
2
+ δ+z
2t1
1 from A
2 from B
Φ(δ)
1 from B
2 from A
Both products from A
Both products from B
Φ(δ)
α2
α2
α1
α1
β1, β2
.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................
.................................................................................
Figure 2: Notation Used in the Analysis
Define the (decreasing) function
Φ(δ) ≡ 2
Z 1
2
− δ+z
2t1
0
Z 1
1
2
+ δ+z
2t2
f(x1, x2) dx2dx1
to be the proportion of consumers who are two-stop shoppers when the firms set the same
tariﬀ which involves the discount δ. The function Φ summarizes many of the economically-
relavant features of this market, and it is depicted on Figure 2. (The symmetry assumption
(4) implies that the two rectangles of two-stop shoppers each contain the same proportion
of consumers.)
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It will be useful to know the derivative of Φ. Write
α1(δ) =
Z 1
1
2
+ δ+z
2t2
f(1
2
− δ + z
2t1
, x2) dx2 ; α2(δ) =
Z 1
2
− δ+z
2t1
0
f(x1, 12 +
δ + z
2t2
) dx1 (6)
for the line integrals depicted on Figure 2. (From (4), the two integrals marked α1 have the
same value, as do those marked α2.) Then
Φ0(δ) = −
µ
α1(δ)
t1
+
α2(δ)
t2
¶
. (7)
Finally, write
β1(δ) =
Z 1
2
+ δ
2t2
1
2
− δ
2t2
f(1
2
+
t2
t1
(1
2
− x2), x2) dx2 ; β2(δ) =
Z 1
2
+ δ
2t1
1
2
− δ
2t1
f(x1, 12 +
t1
t2
(1
2
− x1)) dx1 (8)
for the line integrals along the diagonal segment depicted on Figure 2. Here, β1 is the
integral in the vertical direction, and β2 is the integral in the horizontal direction, and they
are related by t2β1 = t1β2.
3.2 Linear Pricing
Consider first the case where firms compete with linear prices–that is to say with no bundling
discounts in the present context–so δA = δB = 0. For simplicity, write α0i = αi(0) and
β0i = βi(0). Suppose the two firms initially set the same pair of linear prices P1 and P2.
Consider firm A’s incentive to reduce its price P1 by ε, keeping its price for product 2
unchanged at P2. At a symmetric equilibrium, half the consumers buy product 1 from firm
A, and the firm loses revenue ε from each of these infra-marginal consumers. The price
reduction shifts the boundary of the set of consumers who buy product 1 from the firm
uniformly to the right by ε/(2t1), as depicted on Figure 3.
The profit from these marginal consumers is not constant along this boundary. Those
consumers on the two vertical boundaries α01 on the figure generate profit P1 to the firm,
while those on the diagonal boundary β01 generate “double” profit (P1+P2). The total profit
of these marginal consumers is therefore
ε
2t1
× ©2α01P1 + β01(P1 + P2)ª .
Since the profit gained from the marginal consumers must equal the profit lost from the
infra-marginal consumers, it follows that in equilibrium
2α01P1 + β
0
1(P1 + P2) = t1 . (9)
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Similarly, the first-order condition for the stand-alone price P2 is
2α02P2 + β
0
2(P1 + P2) = t2 . (10)
Solving these linear simultaneous equations in (P1, P2) yields explicit formulae for the (unique)
equilibrium prices:
P1 =
α02t1
α01β
0
2 + β
0
1α
0
2 + 2α
0
1α
0
2
; P2 =
α01t2
α01β
0
2 + β
0
1α
0
2 + 2α
0
1α
0
2
. (11)
0 1
x1
x2
1
1
2
+ z
2t2
1
2
− z
2t1
1
2
− z
2t2
1
2
+ z
2t1
1 from A
2 from B
1 from B
2 from A
Both products from A
Both products from B
α01
β01
α01
.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................
.................................................................................
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
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.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
....
Figure 3: Incentive to Reduce Linear Price for Product 1
In most cases, prices and profit falls as the shopping cost z becomes more significant.12
The reason is that, when z is large, the number of consumers (measured by β0i ) who are
indiﬀerent between buying both products fromA and buying both products fromB increases.
These marginal consumers are “doubly profitable” with their two-unit demands. So firms
compete hard to attract these consumers, with the result that prices decrease with z.
12For instance, when product preferences x1 and x2 are independently distributed, the method of proof
for Proposition 6 can show that the sum of the linear prices decreases with z (subject to mild regularity
conditions).
12
It is useful to illustrate these, and subsequent, results by means of a simple example.13
Uniform Example: t1 = t2 = t and f(x1, x2) ≡ 1.
Here, α01 = α
0
2 =
1
2
− z
2t and β
0
1 = β
0
2 =
z
t . From (11) the equilibrium linear price for each
product is
P1 = P2 =
t2
t+ z
, (12)
which is decreasing in z. Therefore, with linear pricing the shopping cost makes the market
more competitive, in much the same way as firms selling their products with a bundling
discount does so.
3.3 Bundling
Suppose next that firms can oﬀer discounts for joint consumption. It turns out that a firm
always has a unilateral incentive to do so.
Proposition 3 Suppose the two firms initially oﬀer the equilibrium linear prices (11). Then
a firm’s profit increases if it unilaterally introduces a small discount δ > 0 for joint purchase.
Proof. Suppose both firms initially oﬀer the linear prices in (11), and consider the eﬀect on
firm A’s profit when it introduces a small joint-purchase discount δ > 0. Let N < 1
2
denote
the proportion of consumers who choose to buy both items from firm A when symmetric
linear prices are oﬀered. Here, the firm loses revenue δ from the N consumers who previously
purchased both products from it in any case, but the discount induces some two-stop shoppers
to buy both products from A. See Figure 4.
Specifically, from Figure 4 one sees that δα01/(2t1) consumers switch from buying product
1 from B and product 2 from A to buying both from A, and each of these consumers brings
in additional profit P1 − δ. Similarly, δα02/(2t2) consumers switch from buying product 1
from A and product 2 from B to buying both from A, and each of these consumers brings
additional profit P2 − δ. Finally, δβ01/(2t1) consumers switch from buying both items from
B to buying both from A, and these “doubly profitable” consumers bring profit P1+P2− δ.
In sum, ignoring terms in δ2, the eﬀect on firm A’s profit of introducing the small discount
δ is approximately
δα01
2t1
P1 +
δα02
2t2
P2 +
δβ01
2t1
(P1 + P2)− δN = δ(12 −N) > 0 .
13This example (with z = 0) was first analyzed by Matutes and Regibeau (1992), and extended in Arm-
strong (2006, section 4.2) to situations where the products were not symmetric in the sense that t1 6= t2.
These earlier analyses took a “brute force” approach by simply calculating the areas of the various regions
in Figure 1. This method is only practical when the distribution of (x1, x2) is uniform, and it cannot be
used to derive more general results, such as Propositions 3, 4 and 6 in this paper.
13
Here, the equality follows from expressions (9)—(10), which proves the result.
This argument is in the same spirit as that used in the monopoly context by McAfee,
McMillan, and Whinston (1989).14 However, in our oligopoly framework a firm always has
an incentive to introduce a positive discount, whereas in the monopoly context it was not
always the case that a discount was profitable.
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Figure 4: Incentive to Introduce Bundling Discount
An intuition for this result goes as follows. Starting from symmetric equilibrium with
linear pricing, there would be no first-order eﬀect on the profits of a firm that reduced each of
its standalone prices by 1
2
δ for small δ because those prices are optimal for the firm (i.e., the
envelope theorem applies). Suppose instead that the firm does not change its stand-alone
prices but introduces a discount δ for joint purchase. From (4), this brings the same gain in
custom for each of the two products as the stand-alone price cuts. But it involves strictly
less foregone profit on intra-marginal custom because the discount is restricted to one-stop
shoppers rather than all the firm’s consumers. The firm, having been roughly indiﬀerent
about the stand-alone price cuts, will therefore strictly gain from the bundling discount. In
sum, oﬀer a bundling discount is a more cost-eﬀective way to boost market share than cuts
in linear prices.
14See Thanassoulis (2006) for a related result.
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Notice, however, that if both firms oﬀer the same (small) joint purchase discount δ, each
firm’s profit falls (by approximatelyNδ) compared to the profit generated with linear pricing.
This illustrates the prisoner’s dilemma nature of competitive bundling.
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Figure 5: Eﬀect of Changing the Bundle Discount
Having established that linear pricing cannot be an equilibrium when firms can oﬀer
bundling discounts, we turn next to analysis of the equilibrium nonlinear tariﬀs. It turns
out that there is a simple and general formula for the equilibrium discount δ:
Proposition 4 In a symmetric equilibrium the discount δ satisfies
Φ(δ) + 1
2
Φ0(δ)δ = 0 . (13)
Proof. Suppose that the symmetric equilibrium nonlinear tariﬀ involves the stand-alone
price P1 for product 1, the stand-alone price P2 for product 2, and the bundling discount
δ. Consider the eﬀect on firm A’s profit if it increases its discount by a small amount 2ε
and simultaneously increases each of its stand-alone prices by ε. The result is that its total
charge to one-stop shoppers is unchanged, but the total charge for each two-stop shopping
option rises by ε. The net eﬀect on the firm’s profit is depicted in Figure 5, where the two-
stop shopping regions shrink to the dashed regions: the deviation moves the upper boundary
marked α1 to the left by ε/(2t1) and lower boundary α1 to the right by the same amount;
15
the upper boundary α2 is moved up by ε/(2t2) and the lower boundary α2 down by the same
amount. The net eﬀect on firm A’s profit is then approximately
(εΦ(δ)) +
ε
2t1
α1(P1 − δ)−
ε
2t1
α1P1 +
ε
2t2
α2(P2 − δ)−
ε
2t2
α2P2 = ε
¡
Φ(δ) + 1
2
Φ0(δ)δ
¢
,
where the equality follows from (7). For this deviation to be unprofitable, expression (13)
must hold in equilibrium.
A simple corollary of this result is that δ tends to zero as the shopping cost z approaches
min{t1, t2}. That is to say, as almost all consumers are anyway one-stop shoppers, there
is little benefit to firms in inducing still more consumers to become one-stop shoppers by
means of a bundle discount. In this sense, the shopping cost reduces the incentive to bundle.
For instance, in the Uniform Example we have Φ(δ) = 2(1
2
− δ+z
2t )
2, and so expression (13)
implies that δ = 1
2
(t− z).
A crucial point is that welfare is reduced when firms oﬀer discounts for joint purchase:
there is excessive loyalty, as more consumers than is eﬃcient buy both products from the
same firm. The eﬃcient pattern of consumption requires there to be no bundling discount,
so that the pattern of demand is as depicted in Figure 3.
By examining Figure 5, one sees that when the discount δ is increased by ε, the extra
consumers who buy product 1 from the less preferred firm is equal to α1t1 ε, and each of these
consumers incurs the extra travel cost (δ+z) compared to buying the product from the closer
firm, although these consumers also save the shopping cost z. Thus, their net disutility is δ.
Similarly, α2t2 ε extra consumers buy product 2 from the less preferred firm, and these each
incur a net disutility δ.
In sum, the extra welfare loss caused by increasing δ by ε is
εδ ×
µ
α1
t1
+
α2
t2
¶
= εδ × (−Φ0(δ)) .
Denote by w(δ) the level of welfare corresponding to the bundling discount δ relative to the
first-best welfare level (i.e., the welfare level corresponding to the case of linear pricing when
δ = 0). Thus −w(δ) is welfare loss relative to the first best. It follows that
w0(δ) = δΦ0(δ) . (14)
This condition and w(0) = 0 yield w(δ). For instance, in the Uniform Example we have
Φ(δ) = 2(1
2
− δ+z
2t )
2 and δ = 1
2
(t− z), in which case (14) implies that the equilibrium welfare
loss relative to the case of linear pricing is
(t− z)3
12t2
. (15)
As expected, as the shopping cost becomes large, this welfare loss falls to zero since the
bundling discount also falls to zero.
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Having derived the equilibrium discount δ as in (13), we can now derive the equilibrium
stand-alone prices P1 and P2 in the same way in which the linear prices were derived in
section 3.2. For simplicity, given the equilibrium δ, write αi = αi(δ) and βi = βi(δ). The
pattern of demand is as shown on Figure 6.
0 1
x1
x2
1
1
2
+ δ+z
2t2
1
2
− δ+z
2t1
1
2
− δ+z
2t2
1
2
+ δ+z
2t1
1 from A
2 from B
1 from B
2 from A
Both products from A
Both products from B
α1
β1
α1
.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................
.................................................................................
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
....
Figure 6: Incentive to Reduce Stand-Alone Price for Product 1
Consider firm A’s incentive to reduce its stand-alone price P1 by ε, keeping its discount
unchanged at δ and its stand-alone price for product 2 unchanged at P2. At a symmetric
equilibrium, half the consumers buy product 1 from firm A, and the firm loses revenue ε
from each of these infra-marginal consumers. The price reduction shifts the boundary of the
set of consumers who buy product 1 from the firm uniformly to the right by ε/(2t1). Those
consumers on the upper boundary α1 on the figure generate profit P1 to the firm, those on
the diagonal boundary β1 generate profit (P1+P2− δ), and those on the lower boundary α1
generate incremental profit (P1 − δ).
Since the profit gained from the marginal consumers must equal the profit lost from the
infra-marginal consumers, it follows that in equilibrium
α1P1 + β1(P1 + P2 − δ) + α1(P1 − δ) = t1 .
Similarly, the first-order condition for the stand-alone price P2 is
α2P2 + β2(P1 + P2 − δ) + α2(P2 − δ) = t2 .
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Solving these linear simultaneous equations in (P1, P2) yields explicit formulae for the stand-
alone prices, as reported in the next result.
Proposition 5 At a symmetric equilibrium, the discount δ satisfies (13) and the stand-alone
prices are
P1 =
δ
2
+
α2t1
α1β2 + β1α2 + 2α1α2
; P2 =
δ
2
+
α1t2
α1β2 + β1α2 + 2α1α2
. (16)
Notice that the stand-alone prices in (16) are uniquely determined given the discount
δ. Then, provided there is a unique solution to the first-order condition for the discount in
(13), which can be ensured by assuming regularity conditions on the shape of Φ, there is
then only one possible nonlinear pricing equilibrium with some two-stop shoppers.15 ,16
In the Uniform Example, with the equilibrium discount δ = 1
2
(t − z) it follows that
α1 = α2 = 14 −
z
4t and β1 = β2 =
1
2
+ z
2t . From (16) the equilibrium tariﬀ is then
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P1 = P2 = 14(t− z) +
2t2
3t+ z
; δ = 1
2
(t− z) . (17)
Therefore, as in the linear pricing regime, the shopping cost z acts to lower all prices. The
reason is the same: the shopping cost expands the margin of “doubly profitable” consumers,
which intensifies competition.
3.4 Comparing the Regimes
The regimes of linear pricing and bundling are easily compared in the Uniform Example.
First, notice that as z tends to t, so that the proportion of two-stop shoppers vanishes, the
tariﬀs associated with linear pricing (12) and with bundling (17) converge. That implies
that profit, consumer surplus and welfare also converge for large z.
Figure 7 depicts relative profit, welfare and consumer surplus for all z ≤ t. The analytic
expression for industry profit with bundling is not illuminating, but can be calculated using
15We have not investigated second-order conditions in general for the tariﬀ in Proposition 5, so cannot
be sure that any (pure strategy) equilibria exists. However, we have examined the case of the uniform
distribution for (x1, x2), and verified that this tariﬀ is a global best response for one firm if the rival oﬀers
the same tariﬀ.
16There is always another, less interesting, pure bundling equilibrium. Suppose one firm oﬀers a tariﬀ
involving extremely high stand-alone prices. Then no consumer will ever be a two-stop shopper, and so the
rival might as well oﬀer a similar tariﬀ. In the case where t1 = t2 = t and (x1, x2) uniformly distributed, one
can show that this pure bundling equilibrium involves setting a price for the bundle equal to t (and setting
the stand-alone prices prohibitively high). However, there are good reasons to believe that this second
equilibrium is non-robust. For instance, it involves firms playing weakly dominated strategies. Moreover,
Thanassoulis (2006) shows that when there are some consumers who wish to buy just one item, this ceases
to be an equilibrium.
17The model of Matutes and Regibeau (1992) corresponds to the case z = 0, when Pi = 1112 t and δ =
1
2 t.
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expression (5). We depict the bundling profit relative to that with linear pricing (divided by
t) as the thin line in the figure. Here, z ranges from zero, where the profit loss with bundling
relative to linear pricing is about 30%, to t, where profit is the same in the two regimes. In
particular, bundling acts to destroy profit relative to linear pricing. The thick line depicts the
diﬀerence in aggregate consumer surplus (divided by t) in the two regimes, which is positive
but decreases to zero as z approaches t.18 In particular, consumers in aggregate are always
better oﬀ in the bundling regime. Finally, the dotted line depicts welfare with bundling (15)
relative to linear pricing (divided by t). Of course, welfare falls when bundling is used. For
instance, when z = 0 only an eighth of consumers are two-stop shoppers with bundling,
whereas maximal eﬃciency requires that half the consumers should use two suppliers (as
occurs with linear pricing).
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Figure 7: The Eﬀect of z on Profit, Consumer Surplus and Welfare
In this example, the stand-alone price with bundling in (17) is lower than the corresponding
linear price in expression (12) whenever z is suﬃciently small.19 In such cases, all prices fall
when bundling is used, and so all consumers benefit. For larger z, the two-stop shoppers are
worse oﬀ in the bundling regime, although (as shown on the figure) overall consumer surplus
is always higher with bundling.
18Thanassoulis (2006) examines eﬀects of mixed bundling on consumer welfare in a version of this frame-
work where there are some “small” consumers who just want one product. He too finds that with no extra
costs of two-stop shopping mixed bundling is better for consumers and worse for firms than stand-alone pric-
ing, but with (prohibitive) shopping costs the opposite can occur as competition for two-product consumers
protects one-product consumers if mixed bundling is disallowed.
19The stand-alone price with bundling is lower than the equilibrium linear price when z < (
√
5− 2)t.
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Moving beyond this example, it appears to be widely true that aggregate consumer
surplus rises, and profit (and of course welfare) falls, when bundling is used. The next
result establishes this in the context of independently distributed product preferences, while
a simple form of correlated brand preferences is analyzed subsequently.
Proposition 6 Suppose that x1 and x2 are independently distributed, with respective density
functions f1(x1) and f2(x2) and respective distribution functions F1(x1) and F2(x2). Suppose
the distributions satisfy the hazard rate conditions
d
dx
F1(x)
f1(x)
≥ 1
4
;
d
dx
F2(x)
f2(x)
≥ 1
4
(18)
(for x ≤ 1
2
). Then compared to the outcome with linear pricing, industry profit and welfare
fall and aggregate consumer surplus rises when bundling is used.
Proof. See appendix.
Before discussing this result in more detail, it is worth checking its robustness to the
presence of correlation in brand preferences. In many situations, it is plausible that if a
consumer prefers firm A’s product 1 then she is more likely to prefer the same firm’s product
2, so that x1 and x2 are correlated. That is to say, firm-level brand preference may be
an important factor in a consumer’s brand preferences over individual products. As is the
case with substantial shopping costs, this situation implies that the proportion of two-stop
shoppers is smaller than in the uncorrelated case. How does this impact on the incentive to
engage in bundling?
In general, the impact of correlation on the bundling discount is not obvious. In rough
terms, an increase in correlation will cause there to be fewer consumers in the “north-west”
and “south-east” portions of the square, i.e., for the function Φ(·) to be shifted downwards.
However, without further information expression (13) does not indicate what happens to
equilibrium δ when Φ is shifted downwards.
For instance, consider the following variant of the Uniform Example.20 For simplicity,
suppose products are symmetric (t1 = t2 = t). Suppose that a fraction ρ of consumers
have perfectly correlated preferences, so that x1 = x2, and this common brand preference is
uniform on [0, 1]. The remaining 1−ρ consumers have locations (x1, x2) uniformly distributed
on the unit square.
In this example, α01 = α
0
2 = (1−ρ)(12−
z
2t) and β
0
1 = β
0
2 =
1
2
− (1−ρ)(1
2
− zt ).21 Therefore,
20A similar framework is used in Nalebuﬀ (2004, section III.C). See Reisinger (2006) for further analysis
of the eﬀect of correlation in a related framework.
21Strictly speaking, βi(δ) in (8) is not defined in this example, since there is no (two-dimensional) “density”
on the line x2 = x1. However, by examining small changes in Pi as depicted on Figure 3, one can verify that
this value for β0i is the appropriate value to use in expression (11).
20
from (11), the equilibrium linear price for each product is
P1 = P2 =
t2
t+ (1− ρ)z .
Thus, positive correlation acts to relax competition (unless there are no shopping costs, in
which case correlation has no impact on linear prices).
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Figure 8: The Eﬀect of ρ on Profit, Consumer Surplus and Welfare
Turning to the case where bundling is employed, Φ(δ) is here equal to 2(1−ρ)(1
2
− δ+z
2t )
2,
and so expression (13) shows that the equilibrium discount does not depend on ρ and equals
δ = 1
2
(t− z). From (14), the welfare cost of bundling with this discount is just scaled down
by the factor (1− ρ), and so from (15) this welfare cost is (1− ρ) (t−z)
3
12t2 . With the discount
δ = 1
2
(t− z), we have α1 = α2 = 14(1− ρ)(1−
z
t ) and β1 = β2 =
1
2
+ 1
2
(1− ρ)zt . Expression
(16) then shows that the equilibrium bundling tariﬀ is
P1 = P2 =
1
4
(t− z) + 2t
2
2t+ (1− ρ)(t+ z) ; δ =
1
2
(t− z) . (19)
Thus, like the linear prices, the equilibrium bundling prices are increasing with correlation.
The stand-alone prices with bundling are higher than the equilibrium linear prices whenever
correlation is suﬃciently strong (e.g., when z = 0, stand-alone prices rise with bundling
whenever ρ > 1
3
). When there is perfect correlation (or if z = t), there are no two-stop
shoppers in equilibrium, and the outcomes with and without bundling coincide.
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Figure 8 represents the relative profit (thin line), welfare (dotted line) and consumer
surplus (thick line) associated with bundling versus linear pricing (all divided by t), as
correlation ρ varies. (The shopping cost z is set equal to zero in the figure.) Thus, the profit-
destroying eﬀect of bundling is mitigated, though not overturned, when there is positive
correlation. By comparing Figures 7 and 8 we see that eﬀects of increased correlation in
product brand preferences is qualitively similar to the eﬀects of increasing the shopping cost.
In this model why do firms do worse, and consumers do better, with nonlinear pricing than
with linear pricing? With nonlinear pricing, Propositions 3 and 4 establish that firms will
choose to oﬀer discounts to one-stop shoppers. Such discounts can intensify price competition
generally so that stand-alone purchases might become cheaper too (or at least they do not
rise by enough to overturn the consumer benefits of the discount). When there are discounts
for joint purchase, a wider margin of competition for one-stop shoppers opens up–i.e.,
consumers for whom the operative choice is to buy both products from firm A or both
from B. Such consumers are “doubly profitable”; they bring two profit margins (less the
discount for joint purchase) so their existence often intensifies price competition generally.
Thus larger bundling discounts discounts, by creating more doubly profitable consumers, may
strengthen incentives to reduce stand-alone prices as well. (The eﬀect is similar to the impact
of the shopping cost z.) Bundling discounts do not necessarily do so, because the discount
itself reduces the profit obtained from the doubly profitable consumers. Nonetheless, even
when bundling raises the stand-alone prices, the price rise is not (under the conditions of
Proposition 6) suﬃcient the outweigh the consumer benefits of the discount.
Therefore consumers usually do better with nonlinear pricing than with linear pricing,
when these eﬀects are lessened. Yet discounts induce the excessive loyalty ineﬃciency, so
depress welfare. It follows that profit is higher with linear pricing.
It is striking that these are exactly the opposite comparative statics to those obtained in
the one-stop shopping model presented in Proposition 2. In that model, where demand was
elastic, giving greater pricing freedom to firms–in particular the freedom to engage in non-
linear pricing–enhanced equilibrium profit and welfare but was detrimental to consumers.
But with consumers able to choose between one- and two-stop shopping, and with inelastic
demand, giving firms the freedom to oﬀer discounts for joint purchase lowers profit and wel-
fare but is good for consumers. We will now analyze a model general enough to encompass
and reconcile these contrasting findings.
4 Bundling and Elastic Demand
In this section we extend the unit-demand bundling model to allow consumers to have elastic
and heterogenous demands. As well as being of interest for its own sake, the more general
model will enable us to explain the sharp contrast between the results from the one-stop
shopping model (section 2) and the unit-demand bundling model (section 3).
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We make the innocuous assumption that consumers buy all their supplies of a given
product from one firm or the other. In general, firm i’s tariﬀ consists of three options:
T i1(q1) is the charge for q1 units of product 1 if the consumer does not buy any product 2
from the firm; T i2(q2) is the corresponding tariﬀ if the consumer only buys product 2 from
the firm, and T i12(q1, q2) is the tariﬀ if the consumer buys all her supplies from the firm.
Suppose a type-θ consumer has gross utility u(θ, q1, q2) if quantity qi of product i is
consumed. If the type-(θ, x1, x2) consumer buys quantities (q1, q2) from firm A, her net
utility is u(θ, q1, q2) − TA12(q1, q2) − t1x1 − t2x2. If she buys quantities (q1, q2) from firm B,
her net utility is u(θ, q1, q2)− TB12(q1, q2)− t1(1− x1)− t2(1− x2). And if she buys quantity
qi of product i from A and quantity qj of product j from B, her utility is u(θ, q1, q2) −
TAi (qi)− TBj (qj)− tixi − tj(1− xj)− z. The consumer will choose quantities and suppliers
to maximize this utility. As in section 2, suppose that θ is distributed independently from
the brand preference parameters (x1, x2). Suppose that each firm incurs a marginal cost ci
for serving a consumer with a unit of product i. Finally, suppose that parameters are such
that all consumers wish to buy some of each product.
In this model two kinds of ineﬃciency can arise. First, marginal prices may diverge
from marginal costs, and as a result there will be a sub-optimal amount of each product
being consumed. This welfare eﬀect was seen with linear pricing in the one-stop shopping
analysis of section 2, but not in the basic bundling model of section 3 where the unit demand
framework meant that high prices had no welfare impact. This is the excessive marginal price
eﬀect. Second, tariﬀs may encourage excessive one-stop shopping, and consumers may be
induced to one-stop shop more often than is socially eﬃcient. This ineﬃciency was seen in
the basic bundling model, but did not arise in the one-stop shopping framework. This is the
excessive loyalty eﬀect. In the unified model presented in this section, both ineﬃciencies can
be present. We will see that with linear pricing, ineﬃciencies arise from excessive marginal
prices but not from excessive loyalty, whereas with nonlinear pricing the reverse is true.
4.1 Linear Pricing
Write v(θ, p1, p2) = maxq1,q2 u(θ, q1, q2)− p1q1 − p2q2 for the consumer surplus of the type-θ
consumer when linear prices are p1 and p2. If both firms set the same linear prices, the
pattern of consumer demand is exactly as depicted on Figure 3. (The θ parameter has no
impact on a consumer’s choice of firm when firms oﬀer the same tariﬀ.) In particular, in a
symmetric equilibrium there will be no ineﬃciency due to excessive loyalty, although there
will be ineﬃciency due to excessive marginal prices.
If firm A undercuts B’s product 1 price by ε, this shifts the boundary of the set of
type-θ consumers who buy the product from A uniformly to the right by ε
2t1 q1(θ, p1, p2).
Each of the marginal consumers on the vertical boundaries α01 brings extra profit (p1 −
c1)q1(θ, p1, p2), while each “doubly profitable” consumer on the diagonal boundary β
0
1 brings
profit (p1 − c1)q1(θ, p1, p2) + (p2 − c2)q2(θ, p1, p2). Set against this is the impact of the price
cut on the profit from infra-marginal consumers. Each of A’s existing consumers of product
23
1 contribute product 1 profit which is changed by ε[q1(θ, p1, p2)+(p1−c1) ∂∂p1 q1(θ, p1, p2)], and
in a symmetric equilibrium the proportion of such consumers equals a half. Finally, there
is the eﬀect of changing p1 on demand for the firm’s product 2. This is only relevant for
the firm’s one-stop shoppers, who are N in number in equilibrium. Each of these one-stop
shoppers generates product 2 profit which is changed by ε(p2 − c2) ∂∂p1 q2(θ, p1, p2).
Putting all this together and taking expectations over θ implies that the first-order con-
dition for p1 to be the equilibrium price for product 1 is this generalization of (9):
Eθ
£¡
2α01(p1 − c1)q1 + β01((p1 − c1)q1 + (p2 − c2)q2
¢
q1
¤
= t1 ×Eθ
·
q1 + (p1 − c1)
∂q1
∂p1
+ 2N(p2 − c2)
∂q2
∂p1
¸
. (20)
(Here, the dependence of demands qi on p1, p2 and θ has been suppressed.) A similar ex-
pression holds for product 2.
Formula (20) is complex, and reflects the eﬀects of own and cross-price elasticities, con-
sumer heterogeneity (via the quadratic terms q21 and q1q2), the extent of product diﬀerenti-
ation, the shopping cost, and correlation in product brand preferences (via the size of N).
An extension to the Uniform Example illustrates some of the main eﬀects.
Linear Uniform Example: ti = t; f(x1, x2) ≡ 1; qi(θ1, θ2, p1, p2) = θi(1− bpi); ci = 0.
Thus, demand functions are linear and exhibit no cross-price eﬀects, and consumer het-
erogeneity is represented by an idiosyncratic multiplicative term θi. Here, suppose that each
θi has mean 1 and variance σ2, and let the covariance of θ1 and θ2 be κσ2 for −1 ≤ κ ≤ 1.
It is quite natural to suppose that there is positive correlation in the scale of demands for
the two products across consumers (i.e., κ > 0), since it is likely that a consumer’s income
will be positively correlated with her demand for each product. The parameter b represents
the sensitivity of demand to marginal price. With a linear price p for each product, industry
profit is 2p(1− bp) and welfare relative to the first best is −bp2.
As in section 3.2, α0i =
1
2
− z
2t and β
0
i =
z
t , and so (20) implies that the equilibrium linear
price for a unit of either product, p, satisfies
p(1− bp)2
1− 2bp =
t2
t+ z + σ2[t+ κz]
, (21)
which generalizes (12). This equilibrium price increases with t and falls with z, b, σ2 and κ.22
The impact of these comparative statics, together with their intuition, will be explored in
section 5.
22The left-hand side of (21) is increasing in p and b over the relevant range 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/(2b). The right-hand
side is increasing in t and decreasing in z, σ2 and κ.
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4.2 Nonlinear Pricing
In this section we establish that it is an equilibrium for firms to oﬀer tariﬀs with marginal
prices equal to marginal costs, and with fixed charges corresponding to the bundling prices
derived in section 3.23
Proposition 7 Suppose that over the relevant range of tariﬀs all consumers wish to purchase
both products. Then it is an equilibrium for each firm to oﬀer the following tariﬀ:
T1(q1) = P1 + c1q1 ; T2(q2) = P2 + c2q2 ; T12(q1, q2) = T1(q1) + T2(q2)− δ , (22)
where P1, P2 and δ comprise the mixed bundling tariﬀ described in Proposition 5.
Proof. See appendix.
Despite the generality of the demand structure and consumer heterogeneity, this equilib-
rium is remarkably simple. As with Proposition 1 the shape and heterogeneity of consumer
demand functions have no impact on either industry profit or on welfare relative to the first
best, so long as all consumers participate. (Welfare continues to be determined by expression
(14).) In particular, and perhaps surprisingly, whether or not the two products are comple-
ments or substitutes in consumer demand makes no diﬀerence to the equilibrium incentive
to oﬀer bundling discounts. In this equilibrium there is eﬃcient marginal-cost pricing, but
there is ineﬃciency due to excessive loyalty. In this more general model, the impact of non-
linear pricing on profit, consumer surplus and welfare is ambiguous. In the next section,
we discuss how the various aspects of consumer preferences determine the net impact of
nonlinear pricing.
5 Comparing the Regimes
In this section we compare linear pricing and fully flexible nonlinear tariﬀs.24 At the end of
section 3 we noted the contrast between the model of one-stop shopping (with elastic demand)
and the model with consumer choice between one- and two-stop shopping (with inelastic
demand) in respect of the consequences for profit, welfare and consumer surplus of allowing
23Notice that, unlike Proposition 1, we have not been able to show that this is the unique symmetric
equilibrium. One reason is the existence of at least one other, pure bundling equilibrium (see footnote 16).
24One could also consider an intermediate regime in which firms oﬀer quantity discounts for a particular
product, but cannot oﬀer bundling discounts across products. In welfare (and profit) terms, this pricing
regime delivers the best of both worlds, since the excessive loyalty eﬀect and the excessive marginal price
eﬀect are both avoided. However, it would be hard for public policy to enforce this intermediate regime,
since in practice it is not always clear what constitutes a distinct product. (For instance, should a season
ticket to a concert series count as an inter-product or intra-product discount?) For this reason, we focus on
the transparent distinction between linear pricing and fully flexible nonlinear tariﬀs.
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firms freedom to depart from linear pricing. The analysis of the unified model of section
4 now allows us to reconcile these findings and to undertake a more general comparison of
linear and nonlinear pricing, and to show the importance of five kinds of economic eﬀect:
(i) demand elasticity, (ii) product diﬀerentiation, (iii) consumer heterogeneity, (iv) shopping
costs, and (v) correlation in brand preferences. The impact of these eﬀects was summarised
in Table 1 in the introduction.
5.1 The Eﬀect of Demand Elasticity
When nonlinear pricing is used, the shape of the demand functions has no eﬀect on profit or
welfare (see Proposition 7). With linear pricing, on the other hand, it is plausible that profit
and welfare are lower when demand is elastic. For instance, in section 2 we suggested that the
“elasticity eﬀect” was one reason why linear prices yielded lower profits than nonlinear prices.
As far as the welfare comparison is concerned, linear pricing has the advantage that there is
no excessive loyalty ineﬃciency, but there is the ineﬃciency due to excessive marginal prices.
This may be expected to become more prominent as demand becomes more elastic, because
for a given price the welfare loss is larger if demand is more elastic. On the other hand,
greater demand elasticity lowers the equilibrium price. However, when consumer demand is
suﬃciently inelastic, the model is approximated by the unit demand model of section 3, in
which case there is no excessive pricing ineﬃciency and nonlinear pricing harms profit and
welfare, but benefits consumers, relative to the case of linear pricing.
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Figure 9: The Eﬀect of Elasticity on Profit, Consumer Surplus and Welfare
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To explore these elasticity eﬀects further consider the Linear Uniform Example, where
the linear price is given by expression (21). With nonlinear pricing, Proposition 7 shows that
profit does not depend on the elasticity parameter b. However, in this example at least,
profit with linear pricing is decreasing in b. When demand is suﬃciently sensitive to price,
profit with nonlinear pricing exceeds that with linear pricing. Thus, in the unified model of
section 4, the impact of nonlinear pricing on profit is ambiguous.
Figure 9 plots (as the thin solid line) the diﬀerence between the profit with nonlinear
pricing and with linear pricing as a function of the elasticity term b (here t = 1, z = 0 and
σ2 = 0). The welfare diﬀerence between nonlinear and linear pricing is plotted as the dotted
line on the figure, while the diﬀerence in consumer surplus is the thick solid line. When b = 0
we return to the unit demand setting, where profit and welfare are reduced with bundling,
while consumers benefit. With suﬃciently elastic demand, the reverse holds. In this example,
welfare is improved by nonlinear pricing even for relatively inelastic demand. Finally, it is
worth noting that for intermediate elasticities, both profit and consumer surplus rise with
nonlinear pricing. Thus, firms and consumers do not inevitably have opposing interests when
it comes to price discrimination.
5.2 The Eﬀect of Product Diﬀerentiation
Generally, when (t1, t2) is small, all prices converge to marginal costs, whether linear or
nonlinear pricing is employed, and so the two regimes yield approximately the same profit,
welfare and consumer surplus.
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Figure 10: The Eﬀect of Product Diﬀerentiation on Profit, Consumer Surplus and Welfare
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For instance, consider the Linear Uniform Example. Figure 10 shows relative profit (the
thin line), consumer surplus (the thick line) and welfare (the dotted line) associated with
nonlinear versus linear pricing as t varies. (Here, b = 1, z = 0 and σ2 = 0.) In this example
welfare is–very slightly–reduced by nonlinear pricing when the products oﬀered by the two
firms are close substitutes. This is true quite generally. The reason is that, when z = 0, the
excessive loyalty welfare loss is proportional to t,25 while the welfare loss due to excessive
marginal prices is of order (t2).26 Thus, for small t, the welfare losses due to excessive loyalty
will dominate the losses due to excessive pricing, and so nonlinear pricing lowers welfare.27
(The analysis in the next section can show that the separate impact of nonlinear pricing on
consumers and profit is ambiguous, even when t is small.) However, Figure 10 indicates that
the welfare loss may be rather small. Moreover, this discussion has assumed that exogenous
shopping costs are zero. Once z > 0, whenever t becomes suﬃciently small, consumers
will become one-stop shoppers regardless of whether nonlinear or linear pricing is used. In
this case there is no extra welfare cost involved in bundling, and the excessive marginal
pricing problem dominates. So nonlinear pricing is then sure to yield higher welfare (as was
demonstrated in section 2).
5.3 The Eﬀect of Consumer Heterogeneity
The discussion in section 2 mentioned the heterogeneity eﬀect, where the presence of con-
sumers with diﬀerent demands acted to intensify linear price competition and to reduce the
profit obtained with linear pricing. In this section we explore this in more detail. The reason
why consumer heterogeneity acts to depress the equilibrium linear prices can be seen from
expression (20). Speaking loosely, a “mean-preserving spread” of the demand functions has
no impact on the right-hand side of (20), but it raises the left-hand side via the quadratic
terms. The impact of this is similar to a reduction in the product diﬀerentiation parameter
t1, which will typically causes prices to fall. The economic intuition is that with hetero-
geneity a price cut attracts proportionally more high demand (hence high profit) consumers
from the rival firm–so improves, at the margin, the mix of consumers (an eﬀect absent with
homogeneity). Since prices are then closer to marginal costs, this acts to boost the welfare
25When z = 0, the discount δ in (13) and the prices Pi in (16) are homogeneous degree one in (t1, t2).
The pattern of demand illustrated in Figure 5 is unaﬀected if (t1, t2) are scaled up proportionally, so long
as all consumers continue to buy both products, and so the equilibrium fraction of one-stop shoppers is
homogeneous degree zero in (t1, t2). The equilibrium welfare diﬀerence w is also homogeneous degree one in
(t1, t2). In particular, when t1 = t2 = t, the welfare loss is proportional to t.
26With linear pricing price-cost margins are roughly proportional to t for small t, which implies that the
welfare loss from excessive marginal prices is of order t2.
27The result contrasts with Armstrong and Vickers (2001, Proposition 3), where we argued that price
discrimination led to welfare gains in markets where firms oﬀered closely substitutable products. In the earlier
paper, we assumed a one-stop shopping framework, so the first-order eﬀect of excessive loyalty caused by
price discrimination was absent. As a result, the comparison focussed on the second-order eﬀects associated
with excessive pricing (which indeed favour price discrimination).
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and consumer surplus associated with linear pricing, but to depress profits. We deduce that
welfare and consumer surplus is more likely to be higher with linear pricing when there is
substantial consumer heterogeneity, while profit is then more likely to be higher with nonlin-
ear pricing. However, the reason is not that heterogeneity boosts the profits from engaging
in price discrimination (as one might perhaps have expected), but rather that it harms profit
when linear prices are used.
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Figure 11: The Eﬀect of Heterogeneity on Profit, Consumer Surplus and Welfare
The eﬀect is illustrated by the Linear Uniform Example. Expression (21) shows that the
equilibrium linear price for each product is decreasing in σ2, which confirms the intuition
that heterogeneity in consumer demand pushes down linear prices. In addition, (21) shows
that the price is decreasing in the correlation in demands for the two products, κ, at least
when there is a positive shopping cost z. The intuition for this is as follows. When z > 0,
there is a set of consumers for whom the relevant margin is whether to buy both products
from either firm A or firm B. When there is correlation in the scale of demand for the
two products, the variance of the total profit from both products rises, and this intensifies
competition for these one-stop shoppers yet further.
By contrast, when firms use nonlinear tariﬀs, Proposition 7 shows that profit, welfare
and consumer surplus do not depend on the variance or correlation in the scale of consumer
demand. Thus, the relative profitability of using nonlinear pricing increases with σ2 and κ.
The reductions in linear prices caused by increased heterogeneity result in relative welfare
with nonlinear pricing decreasing with σ2 and κ. Consumers are better oﬀ with nonlinear
pricing when σ2 is relatively small, but when their demands are more varied consumers (in
aggregate) prefer linear pricing. This is illustrated in Figure 11, which shows relative profit
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(the thin line), consumer surplus (the thick line) and welfare (the dotted line) associated
with nonlinear versus linear pricing as σ2 varies. (Here, b = 1
8
, t = 1, z = 0 and κ = 0.)
5.4 The Eﬀect of the Shopping Cost
When the shopping cost z becomes large, the equilibrium bundling discount δ becomes
small and the excessive loyalty welfare loss becomes small–see Figure 7 above–and the
only relevant factor for welfare is the excessive marginal price problem associated with linear
pricing. We can deduce that for large z, the welfare eﬀect of nonlinear pricing is always
positive. (Of course, the welfare eﬀect of nonlinear pricing may be positive for small z too,
depending on demand elasticities and the other factors we have discussed.) Similarly, for
large z the impact of nonlinear pricing on profit is surely positive, while the impact on
consumer surplus is ultimately negative. In sum, as z becomes large, the one-stop shopping
analysis in section 2 applies.
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Figure 12: The Eﬀect of Shopping Costs on Profit, Consumer Surplus and Welfare
This discussion can be illustrated with the Linear Uniform Example. Figure 12 shows
relative profit (the thin line), consumer surplus (the thick line) and welfare (the almost flat
dotted line) associated with nonlinear versus linear pricing as z varies. (Here, b = 1
8
, t = 1
and σ2 = 0.)
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5.5 The Eﬀect of Correlation in Brand Preferences
Section 5.3 argued that correlation in the scale of demands for the two products, κ, tends
to intensify linear pricing competition (while leaving the outcome with nonlinear pricing
unchanged). The impact of this form of correlation is to increase eﬀective consumer hetero-
geneity, and this decreases welfare and consumer surplus associated with nonlinear pricing
relative to linear pricing. In this section we consider an alternative form of correlation–that
involving the brand preferences for the two products–which has distinct economic eﬀects.
The impact of high correlation in consumer brand preferences is qualitatively similar to
that of large shopping costs. When this form of correlation is strong, the fraction of con-
sumers who might be two-stop shoppers is small, and the eﬀect of nonlinear pricing mirrors
the analysis of one-stop shopping in section 2: profits and welfare rise, while consumers are
harmed. This can be illustrated using the Linear Uniform Example modified to allow for
a fraction ρ of consumers to have perfectly correlated brand preferences (as suggested in
section 3.4). Figure 13 shows relative profit (the thin line), consumer surplus (the thick
line) and welfare (the dotted line) associated with nonlinear versus linear pricing as ρ varies.
(Here, b = 1
8
, t = 1, z = 0 and σ2 = 0.)
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Figure 13: The Eﬀect of Brand Preference Correlation
6 Conclusions
Our analysis of competitive nonlinear pricing and bundling–and its eﬀects on consumer
surplus, profit and welfare–has proceeded from the special models of sections 2 and 3 to
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the considerably broader framework of section 4, which allowed for consumer heterogeneity,
elastic demands, consumer choice between one- and two-stop shopping, and shopping costs.
Yet the broader model was shown to have simple and economically intuitive equilibria when
firms oﬀered nonlinear tariﬀs. The model illuminated the importance of keen competition for
one-stop shoppers when bundling is feasible, and the ineﬃciencies arising from excessive mar-
ginal prices (with linear pricing) and excessive loyalty (with nonlinear pricing). We identified
five economic influences on these sources of ineﬃciency–and hence on the pros and cons of
nonlinear pricing relative to linear pricing–which were summarised in the introduction.
The economic eﬀects discussed in this paper may operate more widely, along with other
influences no doubt. However, though general in some respects, our framework has been con-
fined to static competition between symmetric two-product duopolists in a setting where all
consumers buy some of each product. Natural next steps would be to relax these restrictions.
For example, allowing for free entry instead of duopoly would open up the issue of the
eﬀect of nonlinear pricing on the equilibrium number of firms.28 In the unit demand bundling
model, nonlinear pricing acts to depress profit and welfare. With free entry, this implies that
the equilibrium number of firms will fall, and this could act to mitigate possible “excess
entry”. Bundling might then have a positive impact on welfare, despite the excessive loyalty
problem.
Another extension would be to make the model dynamic, and to allow for “customer
poaching”. Existing models of customer poaching, where a firm sets its current price on the
basis of whether a buyer is a previous or a new customer of the firm, assume unit demands
in each period.29 In the basic version of these models, firms do not commit to their future
prices, and so price low to their rival’s existing customer base. Like the (static) bundling
analysis in this paper, customer poaching tends to benefit consumers and to harm firms
and welfare relative to linear pricing. However, the welfare problem is quite diﬀerent: since
firms oﬀer low prices to existing customers of their rival (rather than discounts to their own
loyal customers as in the bundling framework), customer poaching models involve socially
insuﬃcient rather than excessive loyalty. It would be interesting to see whether the extension
of those models to elastic demand means that nonlinear pricing can benefit firms and welfare,
just as we have shown it can benefit firms and welfare in static bundling models.
These are but two lines of possible further analysis. There is much more to be understood
about the economics of competitive nonlinear pricing and bundling.
28See Stole (1995) for early work in this direction in the one-stop shopping context.
29See Chen (1997) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 6: From (16), for any δ the sum of the stand-alone prices is
P1 + P2 = δ +
t1α2 + t2α1
α1β2 + α2β1 + 2α1α2
,
or
P1 + P2 = δ +
t1
αˆ+ β1
where
αˆ =
2α1α2
t2
t1α1 + α2
.
Therefore, for a particular δ industry profit is
π(δ) = δ +
t1
αˆ+ β1
− δ × {proportion of consumers who one-stop shop}
= δ +
t1
αˆ+ β1
− δ(1− Φ(δ)) ,
where Φ is defined in (13). Therefore,
π(δ) = δΦ(δ) +
t1
αˆ+ β1
. (23)
From (23), aggregate consumer surplus relative to the case of linear pricing, denoted v(δ),
satisfies
v(δ) = w(δ)−
·
δΦ(δ) +
t1
αˆ+ β1
¸
and so
v0(δ) = −Φ(δ)− d
dδ
·
t1
αˆ+ β1
¸
. (24)
(Here, w(δ) is total welfare with discount δ which satisfies expression (14).) Therefore, a
suﬃcient condition for consumer surplus to rise with bundling is that expression (24) be
positive. (Consumer surplus with linear pricing corresponds to δ = 0.)
To make progress, specialize to the case of independence, so that f(x1, x2) ≡ f1(x1)f2(x2).
Write Fi(·) for the distribution function corresponding to fi(·) and write
ηi(δ) ≡
fi(12 −
δ+z
2ti )
Fi(12 −
δ+z
2ti )
.
Then one can show
d
dδ
(αˆ+ β1) = 2t1F1F2
t1η22η
0
1 + t2η
2
1η
0
2
(t1η2 + t2η1)2
= 2t1F1F2φ
0 , (25)
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where
φ(δ) ≡ η1(δ)η2(δ)
t1η2(δ) + t2η1(δ)
and Fi = Fi(12 −
δ+z
2ti ). Then (24) implies that
v0(δ) = −2F1F2 + 2t21
F1F2φ
0
(αˆ+ β1)2
. (26)
Assumption (18) implies that η0i(δ) ≥ 0, which in turn implies φ0(δ) ≥ 0. Notice that (25)
implies
d
dδ
(αˆ+ β1) ≤ 12t1φ
0 .
And since αˆ+ β1 =
1
2
t1φ when δ = −z, we deduce that
αˆ+ β1 ≤ 12t1φ .
From (26) it follows that v(δ) is increasing if
φ0
φ2
=
t1η01
η21
+
t2η02
η22
≥ 1
4
.
A suﬃcient condition for this inequality to hold is the (relatively mild) hazard rate condition
(18). In sum, if condition (18) holds, consumer surplus necessarily rises when bundling is
used.
Since welfare w(δ) is deceasing in δ, it follows immediately that industry profit (which
equals w(δ)− v(δ)) is decreasing in δ under the same conditions. This proves Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 7: Suppose that firm B oﬀers the menu of two-part tariﬀs T1(·),
T2(·) and T12(·, ·) described in (22). We establish that firm A’s best response is to use the
same tariﬀ by means of the following argument.30
Suppose firm A can directly observe a consumer’s parameter θ (but not x1 or x2). We
will calculate firm A’s best response to B’s tariﬀ, given θ. Suppose firm A’s tariﬀ is {TA1 (q1),
TA2 (q2), T
A
12(q1, q2)}. Then let
U1 = max
q1,q2
: u(θ, q1, q2)− TA1 (q1)− T2(q2)
U2 = maxq1,q2
: u(θ, q1, q2)− T1(q1)− TA2 (q2)
U12 = max
q1,q2
: u(θ, q1, q2)− TA12(q1, q2)
be the type-θ consumer’s gross utility (i.e., the utility excluding travel and shopping costs)
when she buys only product 1 from A, only product 2 from A or buys all supplies from A,
30A similar argument was used to prove Armstrong and Vickers (2001, Proposition 5).
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respectively. Next, consider firm A’s most profitable way to generate the utilities U1, U2 and
U12. The most profitable way to generate utility U1 is the solution to the problem
max
T1,q1
: T1 − c1q1 subject to U1 = max
q2
u(θ, q1, q2)− T1 − T2(q2)
which is the same problem as
max
q1,q2
: u(θ, q1, q2)− c1q1 − T2(q2)− U1 .
Clearly, the solution to this problem involves marginal-cost pricing for product 1. That is
to say, given θ it is a dominant strategy for firm A to choose a tariﬀ of the form TA1 (q1) =
PA1 (θ)+c1q1 for some fixed charge P
A
1 (θ). (We write the fixed charge as a function of θ, since
in general it will depend on θ.) A similar argument serves to show that TA2 (q2) = P
A
2 (θ)+c2q2
and TA12(q1, q2) = P
A
1 (θ) + P
A
2 (θ)− δA(θ) + c1q1 + c2q2 for some choice of PA2 (θ) and δA(θ).
Since both firms are setting marginal prices equal to marginal costs, the net utility of the
consumer is
v∗(θ)− [P1 + P2 − δ + t1(1− x1) + t2(1− x2)]
if both products are purchased from B,
v∗(θ)− [PA1 + PA2 − δA + t1x1 + t2x2]
if both products are purchased from A, and
v∗(θ)− [PAi + Pj + tixi + tj(1− xj) + z]
if product i is purchased from A and product j is purchased from B. Here, v∗(θ) =
maxq1,q2 u(θ, q1, q2) − c1q1 − c2q2 is consumer surplus with marginal-cost pricing (exclud-
ing transport and shopping costs). In particular, the consumer’s decision over where to buy
depends only on her total outlay (the terms in square brackets above), and the benefit from
consumption, v∗(θ), does not depend on her choice of suppliers. Therefore, given θ, firm A
will choose the fixed charges PA1 , P
A
2 and the bundling discount δ
A in order to maximize its
profit, given B’s tariﬀ (22). But this is precisely the problem analyzed in section 3, where
Proposition 5 established that the optimal response to the bundling tariﬀ (P1, P2, δ) in (16)
is to use the same bundling tariﬀ.
In sum, we have shown that (i) if firm B sets the tariﬀ (22) and (ii) if firm A can observe
a consumer’s type θ, then the tariﬀ (22) maximizes A’s profit. However, since the tariﬀ (22)
does not depend on θ, this tariﬀmust also be the firm’s best response in the more constrained
problem in which A cannot observe θ, which proves the result.
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